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Abstract 12 
Background 13 
Several countries have controlled the spread of COVID-19 through varying combinations of 14 
border restrictions, case finding, contact tracing and careful calibration on the resumption of 15 
domestic activities. However, evaluating the effectiveness of these measures based on observed 16 
cases alone is challenging as it does not reflect the transmission dynamics of missed infections.  17 
 18 
Methods  19 
Combining data on notified local COVID-19 cases with known and unknown sources of infections 20 
(i.e. linked and unlinked cases) in Singapore in 2020 with a transmission model, we reconstructed 21 
the incidence of missed infections and estimated the relative effectiveness of different types of 22 
outbreak control. We also examined implications for estimation of key real-time metrics — the 23 
reproduction number and ratio of unlinked to linked cases, using observed data only as compared 24 
to accounting for missed infections. 25 
  26 
Findings  27 
Prior to the partial lockdown in Singapore, initiated in April 2020, we estimated 89% (95%CI 75–28 
99%) of the infections caused by notified cases were contact traced, but only 12.5% (95%CI 2–29 
69%) of the infections caused by missed infectors were identified. We estimated that the 30 
reproduction number was 1.23 (95%CI 0.98–1.54) after accounting for missed infections but was 31 
0.90 (95%CI 0.79-1.1) based on notified cases alone. At the height of the outbreak, the ratio of 32 
missed to notified infections was 34.1 (95%CI 26.0–46.6) but the ratio of unlinked to linked 33 
infections was 0.81 (95%CI 0.59–1.36). Our results suggest that when case finding and contact 34 
tracing identifies at least 50% and 20% of the infections caused by missed and notified cases 35 
respectively, the reproduction number could be reduced by more than 14%, rising to 20% when 36 
contact tracing is 80% effective.  37 
  38 
Interpretation 39 
Depending on the relative effectiveness of border restrictions, case finding and contact tracing, 40 
unobserved outbreak dynamics can vary greatly. Commonly used metrics to evaluate outbreak 41 
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2 
control — typically based on notified data — could therefore misrepresent the true underlying 1 
outbreak.  2 
  3 
Funding 4 
  5 
Ministry of Health, Singapore.  6 
 7 
Research in context 8 
 9 
Evidence before this study 10 
 11 
We searched PubMed, BioRxiv and MedRxiv for articles published in English up to Mar 20, 2021 12 
using the terms: (2019-nCoV OR “novel coronavirus” OR COVID-19 OR SARS-CoV-2) AND 13 
(border OR travel OR restrict* OR import*) AND (“case finding” OR surveillance OR test*) AND 14 
(contact trac*) AND (model*). The majority of modelling studies evaluated the effectiveness of 15 
various combinations of interventions in the absence of outbreak data. For studies that 16 
reconstructed the initial spread of COVID-19 with outbreak data, they further simulated 17 
counterfactual scenarios in the presence or absence of these interventions to quantify the impact 18 
to the outbreak trajectory. None of the studies disentangled the effects of case finding, contact 19 
tracing, introduction of imported cases and the reproduction number, in order to reproduce an 20 
observed SARS-CoV-2 outbreak trajectory. 21 
 22 
Added value of this study 23 
 24 
Notified COVID-19 cases with unknown and known sources of infection are identified through 25 
case finding and contact tracing respectively. Their respective daily incidence and the growth rate 26 
over time may differ. By capitalising on these differences in the outbreak data and the use of a 27 
mathematical model, we could identify the key drivers behind the growth and decline of both 28 
notified and missed COVID-19 infections in different time periods — e.g. domestic transmission 29 
vs external introductions, relative role of case finding and contact tracing in domestic 30 
transmission. Estimating the incidence of missed cases also allows us to evaluate the usefulness 31 
of common surveillance metrics that rely on observed cases.  32 
 33 
Implications of all the available evidence 34 
 35 
Comprehensive outbreak investigation data integrated with mathematical modelling helps to 36 
quantify the strengths and weaknesses of each outbreak control intervention during different 37 
stages of the pandemic. This would allow countries to better allocate limited resources to 38 
strengthen outbreak control. Furthermore, the data and modelling approach allows us to estimate 39 
the extent of missed infections in the absence of population wide seroprevalence surveys. This 40 
allows us to compare the growth dynamics of notified and missed infections as reliance on the 41 
observed data alone may create the illusion of a controlled outbreak.  42 
 43 
 44 
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The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in substantial disruption to international travel and trade 2 
due to widespread border restrictions that have been enacted by countries as a key strategy to 3 
reduce the importation and spread of COVID-19.1 In addition to border controls, which do not 4 
totally prevent the importation of cases,2 case finding and contact tracing have formed a central 5 
part of the response in many countries. Case finding has helped in early identification and isolation 6 
of new infections that are not associated with other known cases through testing of suspected 7 
cases and surveillance in target groups.3,4 Meanwhile, contact tracing identifies potential 8 
transmission routes and new infections among contacts of a known case.3,4 Local COVID-19 9 
cases with known and unknown sources of infection can therefore be categorised as ‘linked’ or 10 
‘unlinked’ respectively.3,5  11 
 12 
The occurrence of unlinked COVID-19 cases implies that the pandemic is partly unobserved. This 13 
could be attributed to the importation and transmission from asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic 14 
infections who do not require medical attention6 and underreporting of symptomatic cases7. 15 
Furthermore, failure to trace secondary cases arising from a notified case would also create gaps 16 
in the observed transmission chains. The respective case counts and ratio of unlinked to linked 17 
cases are often used as a metric for the effectiveness of outbreak control, and are closely 18 
monitored in many countries to assess the potential for resuming social and economic activities 19 
and the lifting of border restrictions.8–10 However, methods to establish the relative role of border 20 
restrictions, case finding, contact tracing to the trajectory of linked and unlinked cases, remain 21 
elusive. 22 
 23 
In addition, the pandemic trajectory is often measured by the effective reproduction number which 24 
relies on notified cases or cases extrapolated from observed deaths.11–13 With effective case 25 
isolation and contact tracing, the time spent in the community while infectious for a notified case 26 
is truncated, shortening the observed serial interval (a proxy for generation interval).14 27 
Consequently, the observed chains of transmission are short-lived and, on average, less than 28 
one secondary case is generated.15 As such, it is currently unclear whether metrics based on 29 
observed features such as notified cases and their linkage give an accurate picture on the 30 
underlying outbreak dynamics. 31 
 32 
As countries progressively reopen, it is important for policy makers to understand the parameters 33 
that contributes to the spread of cases and the growth dynamics in undetected cases. Combining 34 
the daily incidence of imported, and local linked and unlinked COVID-19 cases in Singapore with 35 
a mathematical model, we aim to characterise the effectiveness of detection and control 36 
measures over the course of the pandemic and estimate the incidence of missed cases, even 37 
when longitudinal serology surveys are absent. Furthermore, we compared the growth patterns 38 
in missed and notified cases and investigated the implications of making inferences on the 39 
pandemic trajectory based on observed data alone.  40 
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Cases of COVID-19 (confirmed with a respiratory sample positive for SARS-CoV-2 on PCR) 3 
notified to the Ministry of Health, Singapore from Jan 23 to Dec 31, 2020 in Singapore were used. 4 
Extensive epidemiological investigations are conducted for each case to establish their exposure 5 
history prior to notification.16–19 A local linked case was a case with at least one known source of 6 
infection while a local unlinked case was a case with an unknown source of infection. Case finding 7 
measures (i.e. active surveillance) identify local unlinked cases through testing of persons with 8 
acute respiratory infection or pneumonia, routine testing of targeted groups at high-risk of 9 
acquiring or transmitting disease, and ad-hoc testing of sub-populations of interest.3 10 
Imported cases are confirmed COVID-19 cases with travel history to a country with ongoing 11 
COVID-19 outbreak in the preceding 14 days. They were stratified into two main categories, those 12 
quarantined in dedicated facilities upon arrival, and those undergoing home-based quarantine or 13 
who were not quarantined at all, prior to detection.20 The former were tested at the start and end 14 
of their quarantine period and were assumed to be incapable of introducing infections into the 15 
community while the latter, to whom the community were potentially exposed to, could generate 16 
local infections. 17 
All confirmed cases were conveyed to secured isolation facilities and discharged after 21 days 18 
from date of confirmation if assessed to be clinically well, or with sequential negative tests. Cases 19 
occurring in persons residing in a foreign-worker dormitory and notified from Apr 7 to Oct 31, 2020 20 
were omitted from analysis as these dormitories were placed under lockdown for an extended 21 
period of time. As workers were subjected to restricted movements, the opportunity to interact 22 
with the community during this period was minimal and hence they were assumed to be incapable 23 
of driving community-level transmission. Furthermore, about 0.2% of the confirmed cases 24 
occurred in persons providing care to confirmed cases and as these secondary infections were 25 
not community-acquired infections, they were omitted from analysis. 26 
Transmission Model 27 
We simulated disease transmission through a branching process to compute the expected 28 
incidence over time. The model was fitted using a Poisson likelihood to the daily incidence of 29 
linked and unlinked local cases to reconstruct the incidence of missed infections (see 30 
Supplementary Information for details). 31 
Infections were introduced into the population by either notified imported cases who potentially 32 
had contact with community individuals (referred to as notified imported cases with community 33 
contact in the remaining text) or through missed imported infections. We modelled the number of 34 
missed imported infections relative to the number of notified imported cases with community 35 
contact using a factor 𝜌. Both types of imported cases could generate community infections from 36 
the time of arrival to isolation or end of their infectiousness respectively. Community infections 37 
were identified through varying effectiveness of contract tracing of notified cases (i.e. probability 38 
of detecting linked cases, 𝜀link) or case finding (i.e. probability of detecting unlinked cases, 𝜀unlink). 39 
 . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a 
 is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)
The copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 9, 2021. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2021.05.05.21256675doi: medRxiv preprint 
 
5 
The potential reproduction number of an infected individual, 𝑅, was defined as the average 1 
number of secondary cases generated by a single infectious individual over the entire infectious 2 
period in the absence of quarantine/isolation. This is analogous to the reproduction number of a 3 
missed infected individual, 𝑅missed. For a notified case, the amount of time spent in the community 4 
while infectious is generally shorter as compared to a missed infection, either as they sought 5 
medical attention and were isolated, or when a secondary case was identified through contact 6 
tracing and quarantined before being tested positive. The reproduction number of a notified case, 7 
𝑅notified, was defined as the average number of secondary cases generated by a single infectious 8 
individual till the time of quarantine/isolation. Notified cases were assumed to be incapable of 9 
generating offspring infections once isolated. Overall, the effective reproduction number, 𝑅eff, is 10 
an aggregate measure of the reproduction number of both missed and notified cases. 11 
We assumed the generation time was gamma distributed with mean 7.5 days (SD 3.4).21 The 12 
distribution was left-truncated for all imported cases to exclude the infectious period while 13 
overseas and right-truncated for all notified cases due to early case isolation.  14 
Due to varying effectiveness of detection and control measures, and changing social behaviour 15 
over the course of the pandemic, we defined five different time periods with a different value 16 
estimated for the four unknown parameters (𝜌, 𝜀link, 𝜀unlink, 𝑅) for each period – when transmission 17 
was mainly driven by (i) travellers from China, and (ii) travellers from other countries with ongoing 18 
outbreak; the implementation of (iii) partial lockdown within Singapore; (iv) resumption of local 19 
activities, and (v) increased reopening of national borders. Results for 𝜌 were converted to the 20 
average daily number of missed imported cases for each time period to provide an estimate of 21 
the magnitude of missed imported infections and we report the posterior median with 95% credible 22 
intervals (CI) for all model outputs. 23 
 24 
Figure 1 Time periods considered in transmission model  25 
Independent model validation 26 
We validated the model outcomes against two independent population level surveys involving (i)  27 
41,852 preschool staff who underwent a PCR test between May 15 and 29, 2020 followed by 28 
serological testing for confirmed cases and (ii) 1,578 participants of a cross-sectional 29 
seroprevalence survey conducted from Oct 7 to 31, 2020 with participants randomly selected from 30 
the general population.22 Incorporating PCR detection and seroconversion probabilities,23,24 we 31 
estimated PCR and serology positive cases from the model to compare against the incidence rate 32 
in preschool staff, and seroconverted cases from the model to compare against the 33 
seroprevalence rate in the general population (Supplementary Information). Observed data were 34 











(ii i) 7 Apr - 18 Jun: Partial lockdown 
and Phase 1 gradual reopening 
(iv) 19 Jun - 31 Aug: Phase 2 
resumption of more local activities 
(v) 1 Sep - 31 Dec: Phase 2 and Phase 3 
with increased reopening of national 
(i i)1 Mar - 6 Apr: Returning  traveller
from countries with ongoing outbreak
(i) 18 Jan - 29 Feb: Transmission driven 
by travellers arriving from  Wuhan
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6 
using Wilson’s method.25 We performed a z-test to evaluate the difference between the observed 1 
and modelled rates and p values <0.05 were considered statistically significant. 2 
 3 
Modelling varying effectiveness of detecting linked and unlinked cases and impact to epidemic 4 
growth dynamics 5 
We further explored the epidemic growth dynamics in the presence of missed and notified SARS-6 
CoV-2 infections via the use of a next-generation matrix mathematical framework (Supplementary 7 
Information). In general, a notified case spends a reduced amount of time spent in the community 8 
while infectious as compared to a missed infection. This creates a heterogeneity in the 9 
reproduction number of a missed and notified case. As such, we studied the impact of the 𝑅eff 10 
across a range of values for 𝜀link, 𝜀unlink and 𝑅. We assumed a Weibull distributed time of infection 11 
to isolation with mean 9.2 days (SD 4.4) for notified cases (derived from observed data in 12 
symptomatic cases notified from Mar 1 to Apr 6, 2020, Supplementary Figure 1 and Table 1). 13 
The ratio of missed to notified cases established during exponential growth was also modelled to 14 
characterise the extent of case ascertainment and compared against the ratio of unlinked to linked 15 
infections. Lastly, we analysed how different ratios of missed to notified imported cases with 16 
community contact influences the time taken to achieve exponential growth and implications of 17 
inferring outbreak trajectory from transient growth patterns.  18 
All data and code required to reproduce the analysis is available online.26  19 
 20 
 21 
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In Singapore, initial border and outbreak control measures from Jan 18 to Feb 29, 2020 aimed to 2 
reduce the spread of SARS-CoV-2 by infected persons arriving from China. These measures 3 
were progressively expanded from Mar 1, 2020 in response to a surge of imported cases returning 4 
from countries with ongoing outbreaks (figure 2a). Despite the decline in notified imported cases 5 
from Mar 16 to Apr 1, 2020, community transmissions were rising (figure 2b and c). By the time a 6 
nationwide partial lockdown was implemented on Apr 7, 2020, 810 community infections had been 7 
notified. However, our model estimated the majority of the infections had gone undetected, with 8 
2,940 (95% CI 414–26,500) missed (figure 2d). During the partial lockdown period and Phase 1 9 
of reopening (Apr 7–Jun 18, 2020), the estimated daily number of missed cases decreased but 10 
remained above 100 and cumulatively, 20,000 infections (95% CI 15,200–34,400) were missed 11 
(figure 2d). As border restrictions were gradually lifted and economic and social activities 12 
resumed, the number of imported cases with community contact were kept low and there was no 13 
evidence of sustained community transmission (figure 2a–c). Overall, we estimated that 26,700 14 
cases (95% CI 19,400–64,000) were missed in 2020 (figure 2d). 15 
 16 
Figure 2 Daily incidence of COVID-19 cases in Singapore, (A) notified imported cases with 17 
community contact (dark blue bars) and notified imported cases who were quarantined upon 18 
arrival (light blue bars), (B) notified local linked cases (green bars) and the posterior median 19 
(green line) and 95% CI (green shaded area), (C) notified local unlinked cases (pink bars) and 20 
the posterior median (pink line) and 95% CI (pink shaded area), (D) modelled posterior median 21 
local missed infections (line), 50% CI (dark purple shaded area) and 95% CI (light purple shaded 22 
area).  23 
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8 
We estimated that 𝑅 was 1.17 (95% CI 0.97–1.35) at the start of the pandemic. From Mar 1 to 1 
Apr 6, 2020, this increased to 1.38 (95% CI 1.21–1.67) prior to the partial lockdown (figure 3a). 2 
However,  𝑅notified, was lower at 0.90 (95% CI 0.79–1.1) due to the reduced amount of time spent 3 
in the community while infectious compared to a missed infection (supplementary figure 5).. After 4 
accounting for missed infections, the 𝑅eff was 1.23 (95% CI 0.98–1.54) (supplementary figure 5). 5 
While the country’s contact tracing system was able to detect 89% of the secondary cases (𝜀link, 6 
95% CI 75–99%) arising from a notified case, only 12.5% of the infections (𝜀unlink, 95%CI 2-69%) 7 
caused by a missed infected individual were identified through case finding — a sharp decline 8 
from 78% (𝜀unlink, 95% CI 37–99%) as estimated from Jan 18 to Feb 29 (figure 3b and c). We 9 
observed a peak of 70 imported cases per day being isolated and we estimated that 23 imported 10 
cases (95% CI 3–175) were missed daily (figure 3d). 11 
12 
Figure 3 Posterior median (dot), 50% CI (dark vertical lines) and 95% CI (light vertical lines) of 13 
model parameters. (A) potential reproduction number, 𝑅, of a COVID-19 case, (B) effectiveness 14 
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9 
of detecting a linked case, 𝜀link, (C) effectiveness of detecting an unlinked case, 𝜀unlink, (D) average 1 
daily number of missed imported cases in log scale. 2 
During the partial lockdown, although we estimated 𝑅 to be below 1, which signalled a controlled 3 
outbreak, the effectiveness of detecting linked and unlinked cases was low at 50% (95%CI 45–4 
55%) and 1% (95%CI 1–2%) respectively (figure 3b and c). As such, it took about two months to 5 
reach a daily observed incidence of less than 10 (figure 2b and c). As social and economic 6 
activities were progressively resumed from Jun 19, 2020 onwards, the effectiveness of detecting 7 
linked and unlinked cases remained low at 15% (95% CI 13–17%) and 8% (95% CI 6–11%) 8 
respectively. However, with strict quarantine of incoming travellers and continued enforcement of 9 
outbreak control measures, the average daily number of missed imported infections was low at 10 
0.35 (95% CI 0.01–1.27) (figure 3c and d) and 𝑅 was approximately 0.74 (95% CI 0.68–0.79) 11 
(figure 3a and d). By Sep 1, 2020 the contact tracing system’s effectiveness in identifying 12 
secondary cases from a notified case had recovered to 89% (95%CI 65–99%) (figure 3b). 13 
Independent model validation 14 
 15 
While the transmission model was able to reproduce the observed temporal trends, we sought to 16 
further validate the model outputs against independent population level surveys. Firstly, of the 17 
41,852 preschool staff tested between May 15 and 29, 2020, 13 staff were PCR and serology 18 
positive for SARS-CoV-2 infection, which translates to an observed incidence rate of 311 19 
infections per million population (95%CI 181–531) compared to our model estimate of 355 per 20 
million population (95%CI 302–421). Secondly, in a cross-sectional seroprevalence survey from 21 
Oct 7 to 31, 2020, SARS-CoV-2 antibodies were detected in 7 out of 1,578 participants.20 The 22 
observed seroprevalence was 0.44% (95%CI 0.22–0.91%) compared to our model estimate of 23 
0.43% (95%CI 0.31–1.03%). The difference between the observed and modelled rates in both 24 
surveys were statistically insignificant (p=0.63 and p=0.93). 25 
 26 
Varying effectiveness of detecting linked and unlinked cases and implications for epidemic growth  27 
When the effectiveness of detecting linked cases is low (𝜀link=20%), an effectiveness of detecting 28 
unlinked cases of at least 50% results in 𝑅eff approximately 14.1% lower than 𝑅 (figure 4). As the 29 
testing capacity and effectiveness of case finding increases, with a further increase in the ability 30 
to ring fence secondary infections arising from notified cases, 𝜀link, of up to 80%, this could further 31 
reduce the 𝑅eff	to at least 23.3% lower than 𝑅 (figure 4). As a country’s case finding and contact 32 
tracing system strengthens and the time from infection to isolation is reduced, the reduction in the 33 
𝑅eff relative to 𝑅 is expected to increase (supplementary figure 6 and 7). 34 
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Figure 4 Effect of detecting linked and unlinked cases on the effective reproduction number, 𝑅eff. 2 
For a potential reproduction number, 𝑅 of 1.5 (A, D), 1.2 (B, E) and 1.0 (C, F) and a fixed 3 
distribution of time from infection to isolation (Weibull distributed with mean 9.2 days (SD 4.4)), 4 
increasing levels of 𝜀link and 𝜀unlink creates a heterogenous pool of missed and notified infections 5 
with the latter being subjected to early case isolation and hence lowers the 𝑅eff. (B) Grey dashed 6 
line represents 𝑅eff of 1.  7 
 8 
 9 
To characterise the extent of case ascertainment, we estimate the ratio of missed to notified 10 
cases. When 𝜀link is more than 80%, this ratio remains below 1 if 𝜀unlink is greater than 30%. In 11 
other words, aggressive ring fencing of contacts whenever a confirmed case is detected, helps to 12 
ensure that the underlying outbreak is mostly observed (figure 5a). For the same values of 𝜀link 13 
and 𝜀unlink, the ratio of missed to notified cases can be vastly different from the ratio of unlinked to 14 
linked cases — typically used to characterise the extent of outbreak control. When 𝜀unlink is low, 15 
the epidemic becomes increasingly obscure and the ratio of missed to notified cases grows very 16 
large but the ratio of the unlinked to linked cases tends to a fixed value dependent on 𝜀link (figure 17 
5a and b).  18 
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Figure 5 Comparison of unobserved outbreak dynamics with common surveillance metrics. (A) 2 
Ratio of missed to notified cases for varying 𝜀link and 𝜀unlink. Dashed lines implies that the ratio 3 
extends to infinity as 𝜀unlink tends to zero; (B) Ratio of unlinked to linked cases for varying 𝜀link and 4 
𝜀unlink; (C) Ratio of missed to notified cases (turquoise dots) and ratio of unlinked to linked cases 5 
(purple triangle) in different time periods of the pandemic. Posterior median (dot/triangle), 50% CI 6 
(dark vertical lines) and 95% CI (light vertical lines). (D) Generations to exponential growth for an 7 
outbreak with 5 missed imported cases and 95 notified imported cases with community contact, 8 
𝑅 of 1.5, 𝜀link of 80%, for varying 𝜀unlink. 9 
 10 
To put these results into the Singapore context, as the effectiveness of detecting unlinked cases 11 
declined in March during the surge of imported cases and further declined during the partial 12 
lockdown, the ratio of missed to notified cases increased to 34.1 (95%CI 26.0–46.6) and was 13 
 . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a 
 is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)
The copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 9, 2021. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2021.05.05.21256675doi: medRxiv preprint 
 
12 
many times higher than the ratio of unlinked to linked cases of 0.81 (95%CI 0.59–1.36) (figure 1 
5c).  As such, metrics derived from observed data alone do not always accurately reflect the 2 
underlying outbreak. 3 
 4 
Under certain conditions, the time to achieve exponential growth in notified and missed infections 5 
could differ. When 𝜀unlink is low and when the initial ratio of missed to notified imported cases with 6 
community contact is low (5 missed:95 notified), the number of generations required to achieve 7 
exponential growth in notified cases is greater than that in missed cases (figure 5d). This time to 8 
exponential growth is reduced when either the 𝜀unlink is high or when the initial ratio of missed to 9 
notified imported cases with community contact increases (figure 5d and supplementary figure 8). 10 
 11 
Discussion 12 
Using the growth patterns in the daily incidence of local linked and unlinked cases, and imported 13 
cases with community contact, our model was capable of disentangling the effects of case finding 14 
and contact tracing (𝜀unlink  and 𝜀link) from other outbreak interventions that affect the potential 15 
reproduction number of a case (𝑅), at a time before vaccination roll out. In spite of a strong 16 
capability to contact trace, without a tight control on the number of imported cases coupled with 17 
low ability to detect new cases and 𝑅eff exceeding 1, community transmission was sustained, as 18 
witnessed in Singapore’s daily incidence of COVID-19 cases from Mar 1 to Apr 6, 2020. This 19 
surge in community cases affected the ability of the contact tracing system to ring fence notified 20 
cases in the following months (figure 3b) but the partial lockdown with strong enforcement of non-21 
pharmaceutical interventions such as mask wearing, physical distancing, and movement 22 
restrictions helped to reverse the pandemic trajectory (figure 2 and 3). 23 
 24 
As countries progressively resume economic and social activities in partially vaccinated 25 
populations, the potential reproduction number of an infectious individual engaged in these 26 
activities may exceed unity. Case finding and contact tracing help in the early identification and 27 
isolation of (secondary) cases thereby minimising the duration of infectious period spent in the 28 
community. Even if contact tracing capacity is low, if more than half of the infections arising from 29 
a previously undetected infection present to the healthcare system for early testing and isolation, 30 
the 𝑅 of a case could be reduced by more than 14% (figure 4). Increasing the effectiveness of 31 
case finding (𝜀unlink) implies casting a wider surveillance net but ultimately this measure depends 32 
on compliance with testing regimes. We estimated a sharp drop in 𝜀unlink during the partial 33 
lockdown period (figure 3c) and this behaviour was corroborated by behavioural surveys 34 
documenting diminished health-seeking behaviour.27 Factors driving avoidance of testing 35 
warrants further studies as, no matter how many infections can be detected from contact tracing, 36 
the healthcare system relies on the testing and identification of cases in the first instance.   37 
 38 
As contact tracing devices are progressively rolled out to speed up contact tracing and coupled 39 
with effective quarantine and testing of close contacts, for a given 𝜀unlink of 50% and 𝜀link of 80%, 40 
𝑅 is lowered by more than 20% (figure 4). Even if a healthcare system is only able to detect 30–41 
50% of the infections arising from previously undetected infections (𝜀unlink), a high 𝜀link ensures 42 
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13 
aggressive ring fencing of secondary infections arising from an unlinked case and keeps the 1 
outbreak in check (figure 5a).  2 
 3 
Current methods to estimate the effective reproduction number, 𝑅eff	, of SARS-CoV-2 rely on the 4 
notified case incidence or deaths, some with appropriate adjustments to capture the right-5 
censoring of data.11–13,15 However, in the presence of asymptomatic infections6 and 6 
underreporting of symptomatic cases7, these methods neglect the growth dynamics of a non-7 
negligible number of missed infections which can result in misleading inferences. From the model, 8 
we estimated that 𝑅 was about 1.38 from Mar 1 to Apr 6, 2020 (figure 3a). With an effective 9 
contact tracing system that quarantines close contacts and detects close to 90% of the secondary 10 
cases from notified cases, this results in reduced time from infection to isolation and the 11 
reproduction number of a notified case was 0.90, similar to previous modelling estimates.15 12 
Collectively, the 𝑅eff was approximately 1.2, which exceeds 1 and signalled sustained 13 
transmissions (supplementary figure 5).  14 
 15 
By reconstructing the daily incidence of missed infections, we could infer the time-varying level of 16 
case under-ascertainment. We estimated that nearly 90% of the missed infections occurred 17 
between Mar 1 and Jun 18, 2020 and the ratio of missed to notified infections was more than 30 18 
(figure 5c). This overall level of case under-ascertainment was comparable to the estimated 19 
under-ascertainment in symptomatic cases alone in other countries during similar phases of the 20 
pandemic and the under-ascertainment levels in many countries are expected to be higher when 21 
accounting for asymptomatic infections.7 Furthermore, we showed that using the ratio of unlinked 22 
to linked cases — calculated from observed data alone, does not adequately characterise the 23 
extent of outbreak control. The ratio of unlinked to linked cases showed little variation over the 24 
course of the pandemic as compared to the ratio of missed to notified infections and does not 25 
provide warning of a runaway outbreak. 26 
 27 
With the reopening of borders, missed and notified imported cases with community contact could 28 
initiate the first generation of local infections and if there is a low ratio of missed to notified 29 
imported case of 1:19 coupled with a low ability to detect unlinked cases (𝜀unlink = 10%), it takes 3 30 
more generations for the notified cases to achieve exponential growth as compared to the missed 31 
cases (figure 5d). The deviation from exponential growth in notified cases at the early stages of 32 
the outbreak creates an illusion that outbreak can be controlled based on observed data, while 33 
the number of undetected infections continues to escalate. One effective but resource intensive 34 
method of minimising the number of missed imported infections is to implement strict quarantine 35 
and testing of incoming travellers, especially those arriving from countries with high COVID-19 36 
incidence. This reduces the overall number of new infections introduced into the population and 37 
is especially important for countries that have managed to stabilise their epidemic numbers after 38 
the initial wave(s) of infections.  39 
 40 
There are some limitations to our study. Firstly, the model assumes that each of the four 41 
parameters remains constant in a specified time period. As such, we are unable to provide a time-42 
varying measure to characterise the impact of different outbreak detection and control measures 43 
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14 
that were progressively rolled out in the population at a granular level. Instead, time periods were 1 
chosen based on prior knowledge of major policies that would affect at least one of the four model 2 
parameters. Secondly, those imported cases subjected to home quarantine and no quarantine 3 
were assumed to have the same potential of making contact with members of the community as 4 
household transmission might occur, while in reality the amount of community contact would be 5 
different as those under home quarantine could potentially only contact household members. In 6 
the absence of data, we made a conservative assumption that the imported cases under home 7 
quarantine were capable of generating local infections. Further model calibration would require 8 
data on the outcome of the various quarantine measures. Finally, missed infections could arise 9 
from asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic infections, or underreporting of symptomatic cases. We 10 
assumed that 𝑅 is the same among these cases. More information is needed to determine the 11 
temporal variation in the types of cases to account for lowered transmission potential in 12 
asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic cases. At the same time, a key strength to our analysis is 13 
that our model was able to reproduce independent observations in two separate population level 14 
surveys and this lends support to our assumption of a homogeneous 𝑅 among all missed 15 
infections. 16 
 17 
The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has generated new forms of data collection and many new ways to 18 
reconstruct outbreak dynamics and evaluate the extent of missed infections arising from high 19 
asymptomatic rates and underreporting of cases. The daily incidence of linked and unlinked cases 20 
could help countries evaluate their performance in case finding, contact tracing and the 21 
effectiveness of their border restrictions. Missed and notified infections bring about a 22 
heterogeneity in the reproduction number and the mixture of these factors can create an illusion 23 
of a controlled outbreak. As countries progressively reopen borders or plan for pandemics in the 24 
future, it is important to have an integrated surveillance and modelling analysis system to 25 
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